In previous posts, we discussed Jeremy Weinstein’s argument of how rebel groups’ initial access to resources tends to put into motion a series of cascading decisions over who to recruit, how to govern civilians, and how to employ violence against civilians—with the result that initially “rich” rebel groups usually end up using indiscriminate violence against civilians, and those resource-poor groups that survive long enough tend to become “activist” groups with close ties to the populace, and use violence selectively (though in some cases the level of violence may still be high if they face high levels of civilian collaboration with the government).

Now, in this final post of this sequence, we will ask a crucial question: do rebel groups ever change character from “rich” to “activist” or vice versa? And if so, when?

Weinstein argues that rebel groups can face four types of external shocks to their existing organizational logic:

1. Battlefield losses can weaken beliefs by civilians and by the rebels themselves that victory is possible, or near; and it also creates the need to replace casualties.
2. Battlefield success can lead observers to conclude that the rebels are about to win, and therefore that joining the rebels is a ticket to future power or largesse.
3. The rebels may access new economic resources, or economic resources may suddenly halt, threatening to undermine the rebels’ existing organizational logic.
4. The government may change its strategy, increasing the incentives for civilians to cooperate or encouraging rebels to defect.

“Rich” rebels, having previously foreclosed on building trust with civilians, typically respond to 1, 3, and 4 by intensifying violence and repression. (Such groups don’t view 2 as a problem.) They lack the organizational capacity to change course, most of the time. In particular, rebel groups that suddenly lose access to an external patron or that lose their tax resources are no longer able to pay their troops as they once did; but because their personnel are out for personal benefit rather than interested in the common good, a (formerly!) “rich” group would have a very difficult time switching the logic of its behavior to an “activist” model that relies on cultivating support from the populace.

Instead, such groups tend to unleash even more violence against civilians, engaging in more looting to gather resources, more indiscriminate violence to discourage collaboration (which is often self-defeating), and kidnapping and forced recruitment in order to replace battlefield losses. (The Lord’s Resistance Army is a notorious example, relying as it does on recruiting children who it kidnaps and forces to commit atrocities.)

In rare cases, a formerly “rich” group facing utter destruction can decide to try and reconfigure itself as an “activist” group out of desperation. This depends heavily on the presence of talented leadership, and faces many pitfalls such as defection of its current members, distrust by civilians, and continued government pressure.

“Activist” groups tend to react to 1 and 4 (i.e. strategic setbacks of various kinds) by reinforcing their commitment to their existing relationships with civilians. The temptation to resort to forced recruitment to solve short-term problems is certainly present, but typically outweighed by the groups’ long-term orientation. Adversity is not a new problem for such groups. The tricky bit is how they respond to success: an influx of new money or recruits (2 and 3).

Sudden control over new resources can come about in several ways. A rebel group can gain a new patron. It can extend its control over more civilians and suddenly have more tax revenue. It could capture natural resources such as diamond mines. However it happens, new money means new temptations to corruption. In the worst case, the group can find itself slipping into the logic of “rich” groups.

Weinstein finds that “activist” groups are best able to resist this threat if they put in place strong organizational structures to control the new money and make sure it is being spent on strategic objectives, rather than to enrich leaders or troops. If such structures are not present, the group is in great danger of undermining its organizational logic and becoming a “rich” group.

Similarly, a sudden influx of recruits who merely want to “back the stronger horse” threatens to weaken the group’s commitment to its principles and proper behavior towards civilians (in the language of our model, the group would have a higher proportion of “consumers” and fewer “investors”). Successful activist groups are those that respond by strengthening their screening efforts and indoctrination, in order to filter out troublemakers and impress upon the rest that the group operates according to firm rules.

In general, effective leadership seems to be crucial in how a rebel group handles changing conditions. Weinstein theory doesn’t encompass leadership per se, other than noting its importance in influencing outcomes.

****

I have seen very little fiction concerning rebel groups that discusses the challenges brought on by success. This seems like an oversight, given how frequent the problem of “betraying the revolution” is in real life, and more importantly the fantastic story conflicts that can be generated in this way. Now you have a conceptual model for thinking about such conflicts; huzzah!

*****

(This post is part of Politics for Worldbuilders, an occasional series. Many of the previous posts in this series eventually became grist for my handbook for authors and game designers, Beyond Kings and Princesses: Governments for Worldbuilders. The topic of this post belongs in the planned fourth book in this series, working title War for Worldbuilders. No idea when it will be finished, but it should be fun!)